Hopefully it won't work

The New York Times has a story by Catherine Rampell about OPEC and it's little problem:

OPEC announced today that its member countries — a group of 13 oil-producing nations — will cut oil production in an attempt to raise prices. Will it work?
In traditional economic theory, such production-fixing is hard to enforce because individual members of a cartel have an incentive to ignore their agreed-upon quotas. After all, if a member of the cartel produces more than it has agreed to produce, but everybody else sticks to the game plan, it can enjoy the benefits of rising prices and receive higher revenue.
The temptation to cheat has bedeviled OPEC in the past. In the 1980s and 1990s, political conflicts among member states — including a few wars — made sticking to group-decided quotas even less compelling. In recent years oil prices, and demand, had been so high that OPEC did away with its quotas and allowed members to produce at whatever level they saw fit. Now that oil prices are down, though, OPEC members have tried to bury their differences and cooperate.
Cooperation has proven to be difficult, though, because different countries have different production profiles, different government structures and different economic goals. A country like Iran, which has been struggling to increase its production, really wants everyone else to cut production so prices will go up and help Iran prevent a potential budget shortfall. But other countries might have different interests in the matter. Countries that have a lot of oil in reserves, for example, might not want to see prices climb back up, for fear that it will drive businesses and consumers to find alternative energies in the long run. Saudi Arabia has 60 years’ worth of oil reserves; its leadership doesn’t want to find itself several decades from now in a world that no longer needs oil. Even the Saudis, however, do not want to see oil prices fall too much, so the government has an incentive to stick with these targets.
Other countries have their own reasons for not wanting to comply. Angola, for example, is a small oil producer. It wants to ramp up production to maximize revenue in the short term, and so it also has little incentive to stick with a quota. And different countries make different assumptions about where demand is headed, which throws another wrench into the cartel’s plans.
In practice, OPEC members frequently ignore their quotas, Jad says. Typically the cartel must rely upon secondary sources to determine whether a country is complying with agreed-upon production levels. Even when this research proves that a country is lying about how much it is producing, there’s nothing the cartel can do to enforce cooperation.
If prices do keep falling, though, OPEC producers will have an especially strong incentive to cooperate with one another.

Rico says hopefully the whole system will screw itself and we won't be looking at four-buck gas again...