The more things change...

I ran across this really cogent interpretation of US military intervention in an on-going civil war:

"Destroying infrastructures and breaking the backbone of a state, not rebuilding a country and training cadres, were the missions US soldiers had traditionally been equipped and trained for, so peacekeeping would have called for radically new thinking. It was not needed. Given the ambiguity of the orders they received, US commanders decided to do little, a mission that they could easily, and did, carry out. They made force protection the most important, or even the only, objective of what remained, nominally at least, an operation to restore democracy. This meant delegating all dangerous tasks, including policing duties, to (the locals)...
"Orders were strict. Despite the tropical heat, soldiers had to wear full body armor at all times. The military hierarchy reacted strongly whenever it spotted a soldier with sleeves rolled up on CNN. It was not uncommon for senior officers on an inspection tour to personally implement the dress code, rather than delegating such tasks to lower-ranking servicemen. Green Berets were particularly targeted...
"Gen. David C. Meade... insisted that his troops stay inside heavily protected barracks, and that they not talk or give food to anyone outside. Peacekeeping limited itself to a few mobile patrols, conducted by troops with orders not to stop, step off their vehicle, or establish roadblocks... FM 41-10, the standard field manual on civil-military affairs, encourages "direct involvement with the civilian populace" and lists among an occupying force's main duties the protection of law and order and the prevention of human rights abuses.
"An attempt to reduce the availability of weapons among the local populace also met with limited success for lack of proactive policies. The multinational force raided some (local) compounds, but stopped short of attacking every weapons cache and conducting widespread body searches. All too frequently, (locals) accused their personal enemies of owning weapons, further diminishing the US desire to carry out such raids, and forceful seizures eventually gave way to a mere weapons buy-back program. Twenty thousand weapons were seized during the first three months of the occupation, but an estimated 200,000 guns remained in circulation.
"The force's extreme caution was less marked in rural areas, where Special Forces, not light infantry troops, were deployed. Displaying the braggadocio associated with their esprit de corps, Green Berets often refused to wear body armor, showed little respect for the dress code, and sneered at the troops barricaded in (the capital), who did little and feared everybody. Far away from the scrutiny of their superiors, obliged to control thousands of square kilometers with small 12-man A-teams, they did not hesitate to mingle with the local population and to take sides -- often against local tyrants. They prided themselves on being unconventional, resenting that someone from headquarters would criticize them for violating the dress code or alcohol policy. One A-team leader narrowly avoided court-martial for overstepping orders. An intelligence officer received a dishonorable discharge for insisting that the US Army should investigate human rights violations in (local) prisons despite orders not to do so.
"Law enforcement was the thorniest issue. Asking US troops to patrol the streets and to arrest criminals would most certainly have put US lives at risk... On the other hand, a complete breakdown of law and order would have been even more likely to undermine the goal of force protection, so one needed to find someone, preferably not American, willing to police (the country) until a new police force could be trained. Luckily for US soldiers, there was already a force present in (the country) willing to, and experienced in, quelling demonstrations and arresting troublemakers. Unfortunately for (local) civilians, this force was the very Army that had spent the previous (many) years harassing (the locals).
"Despite (local) soldiers' poor human rights record, US troops proceeded to rely on their services for day-to-day law enforcement... "We are not in the business of doing the day-to-day law and order," explained the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a White House briefing.
"The long-term goals (the president) and the UN set were twofold: democratize the country, and develop it economically. Success would be measured by social indicators, not by how many armored divisions were crushed, so it was heavily dependent on the political environment that Operation Restore Democracy operated in. Short-lived, superficial foreign support might doom it, as might an uninspired local political elite.
"In the beginning, democratization seemingly proceeded apace, as (locals) were regularly called to the ballot box. But the international community essentially equated the restoration of democracy with holding regular and clean elections, at the expense of a more comprehensive definition of democracy that would have included civic education, the rule of law, accountability, and viable opposition parties. A commission investigated human rights violations during the (previous) regime, but years passed before a few perpetrators were prosecuted; deputies passed laws reforming courts and prisons, but lack of funds hindered their implementation.
"(Local) politics, complete with betrayals, murders, and plot twists, were as captivating as a particularly brutal soap opera, but the protracted political crisis was nothing to laugh about. Consumed by petty political squabbles, the political class failed to oversee the basic missions of the state. As the number of foreign troops declined, the deficiencies of the quickly-trained, poorly-funded (local) police became more evident. Young and inexperienced, or veterans of the murderous (previous) Army, and aware that sending criminals to the judicial system would not result in a rapid and fair judgment, policemen took to shooting first and asking questions later.
"There are three main lessons to be taken from Operation Restore Democracy, each of which can be applied to other peacekeeping operations. First, shallow motives do not make for a successful intervention. Extensive, long-term international involvement is essential to solve the immense challenges faced by conflict-torn nations, but feel-good operations, as in Somalia, or look-strong operations, as in Haiti, are unlikely to invest the time, and human and financial sacrifices necessary to secure substantive achievements. For this reason, interventions motivated by short-term political interests, even when its promoters drape themselves in an idealistic mantle, are unlikely to succeed, unless these poor, divided nations also present a real strategic value... Where key security interests were at stake, as in former Yugoslavia (1995) and Afghanistan (2001), popular willingness to endure casualties, remain involved for years, and spend billions of dollars made US policy makers' task easier.
"There are three main lessons to be taken from Operation Restore Democracy, each of which can be applied to other peacekeeping operations. First, shallow motives do not make for a successful intervention. Extensive, long-term international involvement is essential to solve the immense challenges faced by conflict-torn nations, but feel-good operations, as in Somalia, or look-strong operations, as in Haiti, are unlikely to invest the time, and human and financial sacrifices necessary to secure substantive achievements. For this reason, interventions motivated by short-term political interests, even when its promoters drape themselves in an idealistic mantle, are unlikely to succeed, unless these poor, divided nations also present a real strategic value, as was not the case in Haiti. Where key security interests were at stake, as in former Yugoslavia (1995) and Afghanistan (2001), popular willingness to endure casualties, remain involved for years, and spend billions of dollars made US policy makers' task easier."

Did you guess the country?
Nope, not Iraq.
It was the Haitian Occupation, under the presidency of Bill Clinton, in 1994.

Some things have changed (besides the party in the White House) in ten years, some things haven't.
One thing that hasn't changed is our inability, as a military, as an administration, and as a people, to learn from the past...